

Resource regimes and collective action



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The Flåm valley and NærøyFjord destination

- **Over half a million tourist every year coming mainly from abroad entering the country in Bergen or Oslo**
- **A node tourist traffic point with train, bus and boat well developed infrastructure.**
- **Less than 20% stay overnight**
- **A municipality of approximate 2000 inhabitants**
- **20 percentage of inhabitant with income from tourist sector**
- **Protected area designated in 2002 & World Heritage site in 2005**
- **Questions addressed:**
 - Overcrowded?
 - Consequences for nature and culture
 - What kind of tourism make benefit for local people?





Research objectives

- **To create knowledge about new management and development models capable of integrating local socio-economic development and conservation goals**
- **The project is connected to different change processes:**
 - New farm measures in World Heritage Areas
 - Attempt to engage large traffic enterprises to contribute economically to the maintenance of the public goods
 - Change in licence regime for scheduled traffic on the fjord (from monopole to competition)

Classical institutional economics (Vatn, 2005)

- Resource regime:
 - Property regime, the ownership and the rules that govern transactions concerning the results from the use of the resource
- Nature resource use necessarily influences other nature resource use due to the inherent interconnectedness of nature resources and natural processes
- Open access is “institutionalized” cost shifting due to the interconnectedness of resources
- Change from open access to common property among the people who produce the goods could change the framework conditions
- In situations with different interests the state may make the chose to favourite some interests on the expense of others

Collective action theory (Elinor Ostrom)

- **She argue against central authorise regulations due to the information problem**
- **Several examples where people manage to self-organise and self-governance resource use to make accordance between individual and collective rationality**
- **But, she also describes situations where these ambitions fail where individuals do not overcome the collective provision of new rules**
- **Current theories of collective action are lacking three elements:**
 - the importance of the characteristics of external political regimes in an analysis of how internal variables affect levels of collective provision of rules;
 - the need to reflect the incremental, self-transforming nature of institutional change
 - the need to include information and transaction costs (Ostrom, 1990, p. 190).

Observation from the theories

- **There are "open access" for the global tourism industry to the most attractive landscapes and destinations in Norway, the Fjords**
 - Only scheduled traffic regulated
- **The conservation regime focus on regulation on land**
 - Still; speed regulation on the fjord
- **Many different resource users with different interests**
 - Farmers and small scale tourism enterprises
 - The accommodation sector with different services
 - Flåm Utvikling: local transport company running the Flåm Railway
 - Fjord 1: main operator in scheduled traffic
 - Global cruise companies
- **No instrument for bringing these different interest together trying to make collective action:**
 - The conservation regime have no attention to make connection between the benefit streams from the use of the public goods and the maintenance of the same goods

Questions and hypothesis

- **How influence ongoing changes in policy regimes in Nærøy Fjord area the ability to make correspondence between individual and collective rationality?**
- **My hypothesis/contributions:**
 - Open access is also income distribution (not only cost distribution). The tourism industry benefit from the farmers maintenance of the landscape
 - The state avoid from favourite some interest on the expense of others: continuing the agriculture subsidies policy for the landscape maintenance
 - State regulation could handle the information problem due to the County Governor reflective communication with the resource users

Hypothesis:

- The new agriculture measures in the area continuing the public funding approach and the state subsidies to the tourism industry
- The policy regimes (conservation, agriculture and boat traffic), the municipality and county representatives and the tourism industry emerge in their attitude to not claim a visitor payback system
- The change in regime for scheduled boat traffic do not stimulate the maintenance of the public goods
- Without a change in attitudes among municipality and county representatives there is no basis for new instruments to strengthen the relationship between benefit streams of the use of the resources and the maintenance of the same resources